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During the 1990s, Central Asia emerged as an idiom for the uncertainty pervading the
post-Cold War climate of global life. This paper therefore queries the intertwining of the
region in world politics and the ways in which the dynamics of international affairs affect
Central Asia. In this respect, the investigation explores the scope and connotations of the
“new Central Asia” label. Its framing provides a context for the conceptual engagement
with the Central Asian agency of international actors. This assessment details the
perception of a regional power vacuum and the emergence of awkward statehood as key
contributing factors to the construction of Central Asia as a permissive environment for
external agency. Consequently, the confrontation with the proliferation of “actorness” in
Central Asia accounts for the dynamics of the “new great game” and the patterns of
“hegemonic fragmegration” in the region.
Copyright  2010, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Produced and
distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved.In Central Asia the position of affairs changes not every
hour, but every minute. Therefore, I say, Vigilance,
vigilance, vigilance. It [Central Asia] is the blank leaf
between the pages of an old and a new dispensation;
the brief interval separating a compact and immemorial
tradition from the rude shock and unfeeling Philistinism
of nineteenth-century civilization. The era of the
Thousand and One Nights, with its strange mixture of
savagery and splendor, of coma and excitement, is fast
fading away, and will soon have yielded up all its
secrets to science. Here in the cities of Alp Arslan, and
Timur, and Abdullah Khan, may be seen the sole





Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang Uthat expiring drama of realistic romance. Lord Curzon
(1889: x-xii)1. Introduction
As the epigraph above suggests, at least since Lord
Curzon’s time, thinking about Central Asia (encompassing
the countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) easily borders on the realm
of fantasy and hyperbole.1 That being so, an ungainly but
important task is to distinguish between the phantoms and
substance in the external involvement in Central Asia. This
seems to be particularly the case when grappling with the
nascent regional agency of a multiple set of diverse (and
often contending) international actorsdboth international
organizations and states. The presumed raison d’etre of
their interactions seems to have rekindled stereotypes ofAn earlier version of this paper has appeared as “Uncovering the
w’ Central Asia: The Dynamics of External Agency in a Turbulent
ion” in E Kavalski (ed) The ‘New’ Central Asia: The Regional Impact of
rnational Actors. London: World Scientiﬁc.
niversity. Produced and distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved.
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debunk the clichéd imagery of the “land of discord,” “pulpit
of the world,” “geographical pivot of history,” “global
chessboard,” etc., it is still legitimate to study historical and
institutional legacies, cross-regional patterns, and lasting
socio-economic structures that shape political phenomena
across Central Asia. An important task, therefore, is to
separate the phantoms from the substance in the
reﬂections on the Central Asian experience(s) during the
over two decades following the annus mirabilis of
1991dmarking the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
During the 1990s the region became an idiom symbol-
izing the uncertainty of the post-ColdWar climate of global
life. Still, the state-building and democratization paradigms
have highlighted issues of borders, minorities and violent
conﬂicts. Thus, rather than a transitory stage, the resilient
and pervasive randomness of Central Asian trends has
challenged the dominant frameworks for the study of both
global and regional patterns. Such a claim necessitates the
qualiﬁcation that the analysis of the regional agency of
external actors points to one of the central problems of
International Relations theorydits engagement with
difference. As (Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney, 2004,
123) demonstrate “difference is almost pre-consciously
treated as simultaneous with disorder, fear, suspicion, and
condescension.” Thus, the contemporary positioning of
Central Asia in the analysis of world politics conﬁrms the
observation that there is still “nonon-Western International
Relations theory” (Acharya and Buzan, 2007). This has led
the study ofworld politics to present “crude and caricatured
understanding of [.] the varying forms of life of ‘non-
Western’ peoples” (Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004, 2).
Having an awareness of this shortcoming within the
epistemological, ontological and methodological purview
of the discipline of International Relations, this paper focus
on the international involvement in Central Asia develops
nuanced contexts for the “more ﬂexible, more dynamic,
and more evolutionary” understanding of “a new world”
marked by “ambiguities, ambivalence, and uncertainty” as
well as simultaneous “transformations at the local,
national, regional, international, and global levels” (Chen,
1998, xiv). In this respect, the dynamic changes in Central
Asia associated with the end of communism, the “revival”
of ethno-political, religious, and clan mobilization, and the
gradual involvement of various international actors have
inspired extensive scholarly and policy engagement with
the region.
However, while many of the debates on the political
developments in the area have been primarily conducted at
the level of empirical consideration, this investigation offers
a critical reﬂection. The contention is that observers ofworld
affairs “need to be cognizant of the powerful cultural forces”
shaping theagencyof international actorswithout “reify[ing]
these forces,” because “culturesdeven ‘security cultur-
es’dare ambiguous, complex, anddynamic, and theycanand
do change over time” (Latham,1998,133–134). The uncovery
of the international agencyofdifferent international actors in
Central Asia traces the trajectories and logics of such changes
and adaptations in their foreign policy making.
In this respect, the current investigation is about the
intertwining of Central Asia with world politics and theway international affairs affect Central Asia. At the same
time, it is also about the place of Central Asiadboth actual
and appropriatedin the study and practice of world poli-
tics. Therefore, this analysis simultaneously generalizes
and contextualizes the “Central Asian experience”. The
claim is that such an approach is relevant to under-
standing the context in which Central Asian issues have
reﬂected and affected the patterns and theories of inter-
national affairs.
This study proceeds by framing the scope, connotations,
and frameworks of the Central Asian label. The following
section, in particular, expounds upon the notion of the
“new Central Asia,” whose content has been substantially
redeﬁned after the region’s rediscovery in 2001 (Lewis,
2008, 1). Such a study provides a background for the
engagement with the Central Asian agency of international
actors. This assessment details the perception of a regional
power vacuum and the emergence of awkward statehood
as key contributing factors to the construction of Central
Asia as a permissive environment for external agency.
Consequently, the confrontation with the proliferation of
“actorness” in Central Asia accounts for the dynamics of the
“new great game” and the patterns of “hegemonic frag-
megration” in the region.2. Framing the new Central Asia
As suggested, the region of Central Asia has become one
of the emblematic features of the post-ColdWar geography
of international relations. The region’s appellation is one of
those labels whose ramiﬁcations are open to contestation.
In this respect, thinking about Central Asia (i.e., deﬁning
and mapping its designations) has never been an easy
enterprise. The outline of its symbolic geography exposes
the particular strategic connotations that the region has
acquired. The reference to the “new Central Asia” therefore
becomes shorthand for the complex challenges confronting
the making of foreign policy in the globalized context of
world politics. The tension between perception and
substance during the 1990s resulted in further deﬁnitional
complications which reﬂect the fuzziness of the functional
and analytical approaches to regional patterns. The region
has been deﬁned either by its commondusually backward,
violent, and fatalisticdculture or the legacy of imperial
rule. This tortuous legacy appears embedded in the very
fabric of the newly independent states that emerged in the
wake of Soviet dissolution.
The claim here is that the analytical ﬁckleness of the
notion of Central Asia reﬂects the “fragmentedness” of
designationsdthat is, such notions neither command what
is spoken through them, nor can they simply be com-
manded. Instead,
they slip and slide, evade our grasp and convey both
more and less than we intended. They do this both
because they have a history and because when we use
them we set them off again on their historical way, in
the unpredictable ways inwhich anything which lives in
the way that it is received through time remains
intractable to the designs that might be made upon it.
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determine the outcome of that reception. To take
aword, then, is to hold a fragment of life and its mystery
in your hand. (Dillon, 1996, 114–115)
The point of departure in understanding the mallea-
bility of the Central Asian label is Iver Neumann’s assertion
that “regions are spoken into existence” (Neumann, 2001,
60), which indicates that the immediate issues for explo-
ration are (i) who does the articulation, and (ii) how does it
matter (i.e. create outcomes). Thus, it is still a daunting task
to deﬁne Central Asia by looking solely at the discourses
and mental mappings of regional complexity, without
intricating them with the external agency of various
international actors. The claim of this study is that it is
external agency that speaks the Central Asian region into
existencedto the extent that it is international actors that
are involved in articulating the boundaries of the region
and positioning Central Asian countries into a category of
states that share similar characteristics (Kassimeris, 2009,
93). In this setting, the suggestion is that a multiplicity of
international actors has been involved in packaging and
repackaging the geographical and geopolitical ramiﬁca-
tions of Central Asia. The concern underpinning such
endeavors seems to reﬂect the experience that no major
empire of the twentieth century has dissolved without its
successor states undergoing protracted and bloody civil
wars (Banuazizi and Weiner, 1994). At the same time, the
desire of (some) international actors to inﬂuence the
direction of Central Asian affairs is not necessarily matched
by a willingness to take positions of leadership in the
region. The pervasive simultaneity of these twin dynamics
constructs a confusing picture which not only underwrites
the terminological and analytical vagueness of regional
patterns, but also suggests that the label of Central Asia, per
se, has become a notion of little explanatory value.
In this respect, the notion of a “new Central Asia” has
been propagated as a fresh analytical platform for
engaging with regional patterns. The newness of the
region was initially associated primarily with the novelty
of independent national statehood. The emergence of the
sovereign post-Soviet “stans” was a development
whichdunlike the experience of other post-communist
countriesddid not spell a return to or a revival of earlier
forms and symbols of independent statehood (Anderson,
1997; Ferdinand, 1994; Garnett et al., 2000; Roy, 2000).
It has been argued that Central Asiansdboth publics and
state-elitesdhad less of a say in their independence than
they had in their absorption into the realm of the Russian
empire during the nineteenth-century. The region thereby
“owed its new separateness to the dissolution of a metro-
politan power, the USSR: a process over which Central
Asian leaders had little control and to which they
contributed little” (Allison, 2004, 463). As a result inde-
pendence appeared to be thrust upon the hesitant regional
states with little warning. The tenuous experience as
Soviet republics did not seem to offer the Central Asian
countries the required “political, economic, and psycho-
logical” preparedness for independent participation in
and interactions with the global society of states (Lloyd,
1997, 97). As one commentator put it, “the Central Asianrepublics were nonplussed; ” they did not know “whether
to celebrate their liberation from the century-old Russian
yoke or to grieve the passing away of their protector and
benefactor” (Shams-ud-Din, 1997, 329).
Very quickly, however, the notion of the “new Central
Asia” was promulgated as an indication of the ﬂuidity of
regional politics, which has demanded more comprehen-
sive conceptualizations of their dynamic patterns. To start
with, the Central Asian states seemed bent on “reestab-
lishing pre-Soviet trade and transport routes” (Lloyd, 1997,
99). Rather than isolated in their landlocked location, the
Central Asian “stans” have gradually become entangled in
interactions stretching from Mongolia and China’s Xinjiang
Autonomous Region, though Kashmir, Pakistan’s North-
western Frontier Province, and Afghanistan, to Iran, Turkey,
and the states of the Caucasus. Thus, although the regional
character of these communications more often than not is
evidenced by different forms of criminal and illegal trans-
national networks (Bohr, 2004, 500), it has nevertheless
shifted international perceptions of the region toward
broader conceptualizations. The notion of a new Central
Asia appears to indicate the enhanced awareness of inter-
national actors that regional issues require a broader
analytical and policy framework within which they can be
addressed. In other words, the regionness of the new
Central Asia derives from the shared socio-economic,
political, and environmental vulnerabilities whose inter-
action drives (if not plagues) the workings of regional
polities.
This proposition should not however be understood as
a suggestion that Central Asian populations do not consti-
tute imagined communities, even if “the development of
a pan-Central Asian regional identity will remain
a chimera” (Bohr, 2004, 502). On the contrary, they do, but
not necessarily ones that ﬁt neatly the conventional
Westphalian schemata of “nation states.” Consequently, the
established modes for analytical and policy adaptation
aimed at grasping and addressing changing realities
become obsolete and new ones are required (Kavalski,
2007a). This is probably one of the most important quali-
tative alterations of our perceptions demanded by the
dynamics framed within the label of a “new Central Asia.”
The contention is that external involvementdespecially,
external involvement intent on the introduction of
a framework of appropriatenessdshapes the social space
and developmental possibilities for the awkward states of
the region (Hall, 2006, 102).
Thus, in order to facilitate the uncovery of the new
Central Asian experiencedpast, present, and pro-
spectivedthis study advances a novel contextualization of
regional patterns by looking at two relationally inter-
connected processes: (i) the role of international organ-
izationsdinclusive of the EU, NATO, the OSCE, and the UNxe
"Kosovo"; and (ii) the agency of individual statesdRussia,
the USA, China, India, Iran, Japan, and Turkey. The new
Central Asia, therefore, is treated here as a prism for teasing
out the regional agency of these actors as well as the strat-
egies through which they are articulated. It provides
a crucial context for engagingwith the agencyunderpinning
international efforts. The contention here is that the region
is not merely a geographic location on the map of world
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national relations. In other words, the new Central Asia
becomes an idiom, an intervening variable, and a context
(i.e., an enabling environment) for the confrontation, on the
one hand,with themodalities and the emergent complexity
of global life, and, on the other hand, the patterns of external
agency in the region.
3. Engaging international agency
This study surveys Central Asian dynamics against the
backdrop of a wide and variegated international involve-
ment in regional trends. The evaluation of such a prolifer-
ation of agency has taken into account the patterns,
contexts, and analytical frameworks informing the
formulations of the strategy of international actors toward
Central Asia. In this respect, this analysis engage in
a parallel comparative assessment of the dominant inter-
national actors engaged in Central Asia. The interlocutors
of such a conversation reﬂect on the dynamics, logics, and
policies underpinning this international involvement. It
would appear that the dominant theme underpinning the
agency of international actors in the region is the goal of
introducing a framework of predictability that would
allow them to make feasible calculations about future
intentions.
Although concurrent, such externally-promoted frame-
works of order are not necessarily internally compatibleda
dynamic captured by the label of the “new great game.” In
other words, Central Asia has become a “zone of intense,
complex interaction between local conditions and the
larger world system” (Hall, 2006, 104). Therefore, the
uncovery of the agency of international organizations and
actors in Central Asia does not impute, nor endow with
coherence the story it tells. Instead, its account facilitates
an encounter with the nuances and complexity character-
izing seemingly straightforward propositions. In order to
facilitate the engagement with the international involve-
ment in Central Asia, the following sections detail the
conditions that have permitted the proliferation of agency
in the region as well as themain features of the interactions
between international actors.
3.1. Central Asia as a permissive environment for
international actors
The recent rash of attention to the proliferation of
agency in international life is underpinned by the recog-
nition that the end of Cold War bipolarity has allowed
a number of actors to extend their international roles and
outreach. In Central Asia, the propagation of such multi-
plicity of distinct attitudes and attempts at framing regional
patterns has been made possible by two inter-related
processes: (i) the perception of a power vacuum in the
region after the dissolution of the Soviet Union; and (ii) the
awkwardness of Central Asian statehood. Analytically,
these dynamics implicate the conditions of an “immature
anarchy” in the region, whichdin contrast to the “mature
anarchy” settingdidentify competitive and fragmented
patterns of relations, which do not appear to be constrained
by the normative framework of international affairs (Buzan,1991, 175). At the same time, it is the interplay between
both of these dynamics that have made the region
permeable (and permeated) by external agency.
3.2. Power vacuum in Central Asia
The perception of a power vacuum in Central Asia
derives from (i) the relative inability of Russiadthe
traditional “big brother” of the regiondto assert its
centrality in the region during the 1990s; and (ii) the
failure of Central Asian regionalization. For the purposes of
brevity, it has to be acknowledged that Moscow’s
engagement in Central Asia reﬂects not only the thorny
history of its interactions with the region, but also the
complexity of Russia’s geography and demographydthat
is, while “eighty-ﬁve percent of the Russian Federation can
be said to lie in the East, eighty-ﬁve percent of its pop-
ulation lives in the West” (Black, 2004, 275). On the one
hand, the weakening of the Kremlin’s position in Central
Asia reﬂects the broader pattern of Moscow’s foreign
policy inconsistencies during the tenure of President Boris
Yeltsin. Thus, Russia’s preoccupation with the Caucasus
(mainly the conﬂict in Chechnya) has led to the attenua-
tion of its position in Central Asia. On the other hand,
Moscow’s foreign policy attention toward integration with
the West and away from the former Soviet republics in the
early 1990s, made its Central Asian policy “uncertain, with
different agencies and institutions holding conﬂicting
points of view with regard to local issues” (Mullojanov
2008, 121–128).
At the same time, these twin dynamics have evinced
Russia’s status as a “declining hegemon” in Central
Asiadi.e., itwas “dominant in the regionbutonlybecause of
a variable combination of acceptance and even greater
weakness on the part of most of the other states [which]
meant that its government was powerless to prevent the
incursion into what it perceived as its sphere of inﬂuence”
(Deyermond, 2009, 160; Jonson, 2001, 95–126). The
declining hegemony of Russia has been underpinned by the
resource-extraction nature of Soviet rule in Central Asia.
During Soviet times, Moscow found itself perpetuating the
Tsarist economic policy, whichdin the words of Lenind
treated the region as a mere “cotton appendix of Russia”
(cited inRywkin,1963, 65). Thus, anumberof commentators
have labeled the Central Asian republics “colonies of the
Soviet Union,” whose economies were deliberately struc-
tured to keep them as “primarily agricultural, produced raw
materials (e.g., cotton and wheat) to be processed else-
where, and exhausted their nonrenewable resources (e.g.
oil, gas, and minerals), and thus were wholly dependent on
other Soviet republics” (Jones Luong, 2004, 8).
Furthermore, this experience of dependency coupled
with the withdrawal of Moscow’s attention from the
region appeared to encourage the newly independent
states of Central Asia to engage more proactively in
diversifying their strategic partnerships. Their geopolitical
location, historical relations with a number of neighboring
countries, and access to hydro-carbon (and other mineral)
resources assisted the compilation of long lists of inter-
national suitors. Such patterns, however, did not seem to
assist the appearance of a Central Asian integrative
E. Kavalski / Journal of Eurasian Studies 2 (2011) 21–29 25process. Instead, tensions and divisions between regional
statesdespecially, between their leadersdappear to have
turned this option into a chimera. It was early in their
experience of independence, despite expectations to the
contrary, when it became conspicuous that Central Asian
states are growing increasingly “hesitant and inconsistent
in formulating regional agendas or structures for security
cooperation” (Allison, 2004, 463). Some trace the origins
of this trend in their shared Soviet experience, when the
Central Asian republics were “parts of a centralized
administration that often deliberately strove to keep them
from being able to play complementary roles for each
other” (Blank, 2004, 139). Commentators have even
ascertained that the deep divisions characterizing intra-
regional relations are “effectively laying to rest for the
foreseeable future prospects for the development of an
inclusive Central Asian regional identity” (Bohr, 2004,
492). But then the question arises: How can the mush-
rooming of various regional organization bringing together
different Central Asian countries be explained?
According to Roy Allison (2008), such frameworks for
institutional relations in the region are instances of the
“bandwagoning” of Central Asian leaders with external
actors to weather different (perceived and real) pressures
and challenges. This contextualization explains regional
organizations such as the Eurasian Economic Community
(EAEC), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO),
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), etc. as alli-
ances of convenience or, what Allison calls, forms of
“virtual regionalism.” The contention is that these orga-
nizations do not strengthen Central Asian regionalization,
not merely because of “the absence of any deeper
regionalist impulse behind them,” but because of their
speciﬁc political functiondthe “reinforcement of regime
security and legitimacy and it has priority over other
security, economic, or trade goals.” Allison argues that
what emerges from these virtual regionalisms of conve-
nience is a process of “protective integration”din other
words, such institutional cooperation between regional
states and some international actors offers protection
against the perceived interventionist strategies of other
actors (Allison, 2008, 185–202).
The growing need to buttress their stability has urged
Central Asian leaders into a growing number of (simulta-
neous) collaborative arrangements with diverse sets of
external actors. This development indicates an interesting
twist on the conventional “patron-client” relationship
between external (hegemonically-minded) actors and
Central Asian statesdnamely, international “patrons” do
offer their Central Asian “clients” assurances about the
maintenance and protection of their sovereignty and
territorial integrity; yet, external actors do not seem to
enjoy more bargaining power (see Kassimeris, 2009, 94).
Such a pattern therefore befuddles the prospects and
processes of regionalization in Central Asia which further
strengthens the perception of a regional power vacuum.
Yet, apart from the observation of a power vacuum in the
regiondbecause of Russia’s perceived withdrawal from the
region and the failure of Central Asian region-buil-
dingdexternal agency has also greatly been abetted by the
awkwardness of Central Asian statehood.3.3. Awkward statehood in Central Asia
The notion of “awkward states” (Field, 2001; Kavalski,
2006) is used as a designation of the condition of interna-
tional existence of Central Asian polities. It reﬂects the
assertion that the countries of the region were “hardly
prepared for an unexpected adventure in state-building”
(Lewis, 2008, 123). Thus, although the post-Soviet transi-
tion has marked a sharp (if uncertain) break with the past,
the subsequent trajectories of Central Asian states exhibit
“puzzling” ongoing dynamics “between the formal and the
informal elements of politics, and a surprising re-emer-
gence of informal organizations embedded in both the
Soviet and the pre-Soviet political order of this region”
(Collins, 2006, 5).
Unlike its treatment as another synonym for “weak,”
“failed,” or “quasi” states, the use of the term “awkward
states” here expands its meaning beyond a mere indication
of the Weberian dysfunctionality of Central Asian state-
hood. The notion of “awkwardness” problematizes simul-
taneously the concepts, images, and process of domestic
rule and international behavior. On the one hand, awkward
states are characterized not only by their volatility, but by
a mode of government whose methods and practices
contradict accepted norms and rules (Kavalski, 2008a, 74).
The process of state-building, in this context implies
a process of establishing authority over a given terri-
torydi.e., “state-building in the literal sense of the word”
(Grzymala-Busse and Jones Luong, 2002, 2). On the other
hand, awkward states engage in occasionally erratic and
oftentimes unpredictable international behavior (to the
extent that they are willing to interact with the outside
world at all, as the case of Turkmenistan illustrates).
Thus, the awkwardness of Central Asian statehood
becomes an idiom for the topsyturvydom of the post-Cold
War climate of world politics where more often than not
inter-state relations are characterized by a modicum of
order, while intra-state affairs elicit patterns of anarchy. As
Stephen Blank has suggested, the Central Asian states
exhibit the exigencies faced by decision-making without
the sufﬁcient means and resources for meaningful action.
In this respect, “their primary concern is internal security
[.] Consequently, foreign policy’s purpose is to protect the
internal regime from domestic anarchy that lies inside of it
and that can be stimulated by the pressures of the outside
world” (Blank, 2004, 139–140; Kavalski, 2010). Such prior-
itization of the value of domestic stability by Central Asian
regimes is a function of the “privatization of decision-
making” (Krastev, 2003, 8) by regional rulers. The
awkwardness of Central Asian statehood reﬂects the
emergence of practices, which are “designed to ensure that
the leader remains untainted by the failure of the state to
deliver on its promises” (Lewis, 2008, 163). The contention
is that unlike integrated states (which tend to be charac-
terized by deliberative peace within and between socie-
ties), awkward states belie a spectrum of enmity and
insecurity (Kavalski, 2008a, 76). Thus, the international
involvement in awkward states demonstrates their treat-
ment by external actors as far as possible as states, while
guarding against the undesirable effects of their
awkwardness (Navari, 2003, 106).
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ient and pervasive uncertainty of Central Asian trends
attests to the entrenchment of the region’s awkwardness in
global life. Consequently, this situation presents interna-
tional actors with the demands of “‘complex socialization’
in a complex situation” (Flockhart, 2005, 62). The dyna-
mism of complexity in Central Asia instances regional
awkward states with relatively vast endowments but low
institutional capacities, challenged by “strongly networked
and semi-modern societies” (Collins, 2006, 48). The lack of
“effective” and “neutral” state institutions has urged
Central Asian populations to withdraw in “an essentially
private world, revolving around family, friends, and work,
with as little engagement as possible with the repressive
state” (Lewis, 2008, 47). Awkward states, thereby, have the
tendency to make their citizens “demobilized and dis-
united” as well as “quite cynical” about the political process
(Bunce and Wolchik, 2009, 72). In this context, interna-
tional agency is oftentimes co-opted by Central Asian rulers
to bolster the appearance of legitimacydboth domestically
and internationallydfor their authoritarian regimes
(Lewis, 2008). In other words, the demand for recognition
underpins the willingness of the awkward states of the
region to engage with a wide range of international actors.
3.4. Confronting the proliferation of actorness in Central Asia
The confrontation with the proliferation of external
agency in Central Asia requires an understanding of the
“actorness” of the international organizations and states
active in the region. Actorness deﬁnes the capacity of an
international actor, to speak, inﬂuence and act cohesively in
different international environments. In other words, it
encompasses an actor’s ability both to achieve its goals and
to transmit institutions, practices, and norms that would
construct an environment congruent with and conducive to
its agency. A central feature of actorness is cohesion since
without it an agentmerely has a presence but no capacity to
act (Allen and Smith,1990). Actorness, thereby, identiﬁes an
“ability to behave in ways that have consequences in inter-
national politics” (Hopkins and Mansbach, 1973, 36–37).
Actorness, however, is not a static condition. An actor can
display “varying degrees of ‘actorhood’ across issues and
time” (Caporaso and Jupille, 1998, 244; Kavalski, 2009b).
In other words, the assessment of the Central Asian
agency of the actors included in this study offers insights
only into their regional policies and not their foreign policy
strategies, per se. Although the two are related, the
(particular) Central Asian and the (general) international
relations of external actors reﬂect distinct conceptualiza-
tions of identity, interests, utility, and effort that are
contingent both on contextual and ideational interpreta-
tions. For instance, the Central Asian agency of the inter-
national actors suggests the modes in which each of them
conceives their agency in the region, not in global life
(although the two aspects inﬂuence and impact on one
another). Actorness, thereby is “conditioned by circum-
stances aswell as by formal grantsof authority” (Laffan et al.,
1999, 169). Furthermore, it is framed by the ability of
external actors to adjust to the dynamic processes at work
both within regional states and between the state andsociety (Kavalski, 2007b, 851). The increase in the interna-
tional involvement in the region is characterized by the twin
dynamics of the “new great game” and “hegemonic frag-
megration,” which are detailed in the following sections.
3.5. “New great game” In Central Asia
The origins of the notion and practices of the “new great
game” in Central Asia are traditionally traced to the
permissive environmentdespecially, the perception of
a power vacuum in the regiondthat emerged in thewake of
Soviet dissolution (Ehteshami, 1995; Kavalski, 2009c). In
other words, the break-up of the Soviet Union did not alter
the geographic location of the region, but its meaning
(Bhattacharjea, 2008,11). Thus, the growinguseof thenotion
of a “newgreat game” seems to simultaneouslycoincidewith
and be caused by the revival of interest in geopolitics as
a viable framework for describing, explaining, and under-
standing the international affairs of Central Asia (Edwards,
2003, 83). In this respect, what appears to be “new” about
this “great game” (in comparison with its nineteenth-
century variant) is the simultaneous proliferation of external
(i.e., from outside the region) and internal (i.e., regional)
agency. Likewise, one commentator has ascertained that
“this new ‘great game’ in the heart of Asia is unfolding not so
much among the old colonial powers as among their former
minions, many of whom are themselves just emerging from
colonial domination and seeking to deﬁne their roles in their
regions and the world” (Rumer, 1993, 89).
Such an understanding has provoked the drafting of
extensive lists of actors with vested interests in Central
Asian resources. Usually, such lists include (but are not
limited to) China, the EU, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Ara-
bia, Turkey, the USA, etc (Kavalski, 2009b). It has to be
acknowledged that what distinguishes such involvement of
international actors in regional affairs is that they do not
appear to be interested in imperial expansion for the
control of territory, but in gaining access to the strategic
resources of Central Asia (Muni, 2003, 97–98). In other
words, the “new great game” is about the creation of
“niches of inﬂuence” (Shams-ud-Din, 1997, 340). Such an
inﬂuence does not rely on or derive from the territorial
effects of external actors (as conventional geopolitics
would suggest), but on their distinct regimes of governance
(Goetze and Guzina, 2008, 334). Central Asia, thereby,
emerges as the contested site of competing “nodes of
governance”dexternally-promoted strategies aimed at the
transmission of rules, produced elsewhere (Bliesemann de
Guevara, 2008, 348; Kavalski, 2007c). Consequently, the
notion of the new great game comes to characterize the
dynamics of processing, selection, and internalization of
some rules and not others.
At the same time, and more signiﬁcantly, the Central
Asian states do not appear to be the “pawns of great
powers” any longerdthat is, the proliferation of external
agency has intensiﬁed the contest between international
actors vying for the attention of regional countries. This
context has provided a facilitating environment for “pick-
and-choose” strategies and bandwagoning for proﬁt poli-
cies (Kavalski, 2007b, 856). In fact, all ﬁve of the Central
Asian states have indicated their propensity and panache
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space for such independent agency by Central Asian states
reveals the qualitative distinction of the new great game
from its nineteenth-century version. In other words,
regional states might be compelled to indicate their
preferred model of external agency, but they are not
constrained to comply with its injunctions for long and
oftentimes swing their preferences to another external
pole of attraction. As a result, the assertions of political
solidarity with different international actors do not
diminish the competitive nature of Central Asian affairs,
not only because such closeness of relations is temporary,
but also because they are in no way intended to diminish
the regional divisions between different actors (Allison,
2008, 186)
In this respect, the proclamations of a new great game
appear to demonstrate the transformation of the pattern of
Central Asian affairs into one which is dominated by
a complex network of overlapping inter-regional relations
(Katzenstein, 2005; Kavalski, 2009a). The various interna-
tional actors engaged in Central Asia are also promoting
their own and distinct regionalizing strategies. The
discourses of the new great game, thereby, acknowledge
the extant potent symbolic resources that simultaneously
reﬂect and create social processes throughwhichmeanings
are exchanged (Kinnvall, 2006). This inference conﬁrms
that the foreign policy of Central Asian states is unlikely to
be formed independently of their external environment
because of expectations that their relations are “to be of
a certain context” and “owing to restraints such as [their]
economic, political, military, and cultural ties with other
states” (Kassimeris, 2009, 94). In this respect, the foreign
policy engagement of various international actors in
Central Asia indicates the particular political, socio-
economic, and (geo)historical conditions within which
their agency is framed.
3.6. Hegemonic fragmegration In Central Asia
The discourses of the new great game in Central Asia
have provoked a concerted effort at the positioning of
regional patterns within the frameworks for understanding
and explanation available to the study of international
relations (Kavalski, 2010). Such interest reveals that even if
local (and localized), Central Asian affairs are nevertheless
enmeshed in global networks of relations. In other words,
“‘things’dooccur locally but notnecessarily solely as a result
of local inﬂuences. Similarly, local changes can alter the
nature of wider networks” (Gills and Thompson, 2006, 2).
International agency, thereby, has a signiﬁcant impact
on the pattern, ﬂow, and character of regional interactions.
In the instance of Central Asia, it reveals the (uneasy)
merger of the region into the currents of world politics. The
incorporation of Central Asia conﬁrms the historical
observation that the effects of even very mild forms of
incorporation into the global system of international rela-
tions can be quite dramatic (Hall 2006, 99)despecially, in
awkward states. The pattern of relations in Central Asia,
thus, points to the pervasive “fragmegration” of global
lifedthe simultaneity between fragmenting and inte-
grating processes in international affairs, which “serves asa constant reminder that the world has moved beyond the
condition of being ‘post’ its predecessor to an era in which
the foundations of daily life have settled into new and
unique rhythms of their own” (Rosenau, 2003, 11). In this
setting, the ensuing increased awareness of vulnerability to
distant causes conveys a sense of chaotic uncertainty
prompted by the catalytic effects of small events, whose
consequences are felt later, elsewhere, and by others
(Kavalski, 2008b, 426).
This awareness has provoked nuanced engagement with
the Central Asian agency of international actors. Ruth
Deyermond (2009) has provided one of the most erudite
accounts of the “multi-levelled hegemonic encounter”
between different international actors in the region. Her
analysis acknowledges that external actors bent on inﬂu-
encing Central Asian patterns can simultaneously coexist,
cooperate, and compete at the different levels of their
interactions in the region. Deyermond captures this condi-
tion through her “matrioshka model of hegemony”dthat is,
“in the same way that Russian matrioshka dolls, identical in
appearance and function but varying in size, can be accom-
modated within one another, so hegemonsdfunctionally
similar but operating at global regional, and sub-regional
levelsdappear to coexist.” While accounting for the
concurrence of competition and cooperation on the same
issues, between the same set of actors, at the same time, and
in the same region, Deyermond’s suggestion of multi-lev-
elled hegemony also indicates that “the global hegemon is
not necessarily the hegemon in any given region”
(Deyermond, 2009, 151–173).
In this respect, the claim here is that the complexity of
Central Asian interactions among various international
actors reveals a pattern of hegemonic fragmegrationdthe
simultaneous attempt by external actors to inﬂuence
Central Asian patterns, which pushes them to continuously
align and re-align themselves with various other actors to
advance their own goals and thwart the advances of oth-
ersdan objective, which also produces some paradoxical
alliances between them. This dynamic of hegemonic frag-
megration prevents the emergence of a single leading
power dominating Central Asian affairs, but also seems to
make unlikely the outbreak of violent confrontation
between them in the region.
4. Conclusion
The phenomenon of the proliferation of international
agency in Central Asia is part of the ongoing collapse of
different geopolitical areas into a single globalized network
of inter-regional interactions. Paradoxically, it was the
establishment of the ancient Silk Road that set this process
in motion, by bringing into contactdand eventually mer-
gingdthe regional frameworks of Europe, Africa, West Asia
with the one of East Asia via the Central Asian region
(Ciofﬁ-Revilla, 2006, 89). In this respect, the signiﬁcance of
Central Asia is likely to increase in the context of broad-
ening and deepening the dynamics of globalization.
In this respect, commentators have pointed out that the
post-Cold War rediscovery of Central Asia by the world
“was always going to be a traumatic and dangerous
process” (Lewis, 2008, 3). The claim here is that “what
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gent post-Soviet states both gains facticity through the
patterns of international relations and “makes new sense
by adapting to the evolutive geostrategy of an area in the
making” (Roy, 2000, 200).
The sense of trauma and danger arises from the failure
to provide the overwhelming majority of the Central Asian
populations with the opportunity for independent lives.
This condition contrast the experience of the states in
which those populations live in and whose independence
from the Soviet Union appears to have been translated into
a structural capacity for international promiscuitydthe
ability to engage with a range of external actors in order to
ensure the survival of Central Asian regimes. The impact of
international actors on Central Asian societies is deliber-
ately skimmed over. The reason is that external efforts are
targeted exclusively at state-elites and building state-level
institutional arrangements (Kavalski, 2008a). The choice
for leaving this lacuna open intends to draw attention to
this disturbing feature of international agency. It is not least
because of international disentanglement from social
concerns that there is a growing detachment of regional
populations from the states they inhabit.
In other words, international actors furnish the capac-
ities of authoritarian and repressive regimes, whose appeal
among local populations is tied to external assistance. Thus,
there emerges a marked distinction between state and
society (or informal social networks) in the region, which
did not seem to exist at the time of the dissolution of the
USSR. As commentators have asserted the “boundary
between the state and society [in Central Asia] was
purposefully blurred” by the Soviet system “in accordance
with the vision of creating a heroic-Leninist state” and in an
attempt to prevent the development of independent soci-
etal organizations that could become alternative hubs of
powerand resistance (Jones Luong, 2004, 24). Consequently,
thewithdrawal into the informal system of clan networking
and structures of patronage provides alternative mecha-
nisms for political mobilization (Collins, 2006, 11).
Bearing this in mind, Paula Pickering (2007) has argued
that international actors interested in the stability of Eur-
asia need to desist the temptations to dismiss such societal
networks as “backward.” Instead, the existence of these
informal structures reﬂects “a practical approach [for
survival] that is born out of necessity and tied to experi-
ence.” The authoritarian framework of awkward statehood
in Central Asia has compelled regional populations to
develop indigenous structures for adaptation. Thus, the
formal state structuresdmaintained and buttressed by
international agencydfail to resonate with the citizens of
Central Asian states “fomenting disillusionment and
encouraging reliance on the informal ties that, as with prior
generations, helped ordinary people cope with the political
institutions that do not appear to offer them a better life”
(Pickering, 2007, 165–188).
International actors in this regard bolster the hold on
power of regional state-elites. The understanding provided
by this investigation inscribes itself within the project of
“lifting people as individuals and groups out of structural
and contingent oppression” (Booth, 2007, 110). Such an
endeavor entails not only holding regional leaders toaccount, but also the agency of external actors. It is hoped
that this study will contribute to this critical conversation.
Returning to Lord Curzon’s words in the epigraph to this
article, the dynamics of international agency in Central Asia
seem to suggest that the “expiring drama of realistic
romance” is still being enacted in the region and the stakes
for all involved are as high as the principles to which they
are held accountable.References
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